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On Gender Neutrality: Derrida and 
Transfeminism in Conversation
Marie Draz
There is already a long history of conversation between feminism and 
 deconstruction, feminist theorists and Derrida or Derrideans. That conver-
sation has been by turns fraught and constructive. While some of these 
interactions have occurred in queer feminism, to date little has been done to 
stage an engagement between deconstruction and transfeminism. Naysayers 
might think that transfeminism is too recent and too identitarian a discourse 
to meaningfully interact with Derrida’s legacy. On the other hand, perhaps 
Derrida’s work was too embedded in second wave feminism, and in some cases 
implicit misogyny and transphobia, to meet transfeminism on its own playing 
field. And yet, I think both suspicions shortchange these discourses. In what 
follows, I stage a conversation between Derrida and two writers working 
in the area of transfeminism: Paisley Currah and Julia Serano. I explore, in 
particular, how their conceptions of gender neutrality or gender pluralism are 
complementary and together change the so-called “question of woman” from 
a philosophical and political perspective.
In a recent blog post (2016), Paisley Currah reflects on the willingness of major 
corporations like Facebook and Apple to boycott states with anti-LGBT laws. 
He compares this to a relative lack of corporate interest in boycotting states with 
antiabortion laws. As a transgender studies scholar, Currah is especially interested 
in the role of trans politics in these respective debates over LGBT and women’s 
rights. Trans politics often extends feminist insights about gender norms by more 
directly contesting the very necessity (and often violent effects) of assigned sex 
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in the first place. Accordingly, the term “transgender” has come to encompass 
multiple ways in which one might depart from the gendered expectations given at 
birth. Trans politics, therefore, takes the proliferation of gender difference, rather 
than the  affirmation of a sexed essence, as a central goal. As Currah puts it, “For 
all those many kinds of people under the transgender umbrella, politics focuses 
now on all the ways in which gender can be remixed: from the now traditional 
male-to-female and female-to-male transition trajectories to genderqueer to 
non-binary.” Nevertheless, Currah wonders, how has this emphasis on gender 
pluralism, or the expansion of possibilities for gendered identities and practices, 
affected the interplay between trans and feminist politics?
Currah hypothesizes that the gender pluralism pursued by some strands of 
transgender politics (including, he notes, his own earlier work) has resulted in the 
loss of an ability to diagnose the continued “subordination” of women (including 
trans women). This is tied to a residual gender “asymmetry.” Such a politics, 
then, seems potentially unaccountable to the way in which “one’s position toward 
the feminine end of the continuum (if not the binary) still has effects,” effects 
of silencing, violence, and even death. As the proliferation of gender identities 
becomes an important political goal, Currah asks what has happened to the focus 
on misogyny and sexism. Has an emphasis on gender pluralism lessened our 
ability to analyze the differential effects of power and history depending on one’s 
gender location? In other words, while the critique of an ahistorical, universal-
izing account of sexual difference was (and continues to be) necessary, it is also 
important to identify what else has been lost in this process. Currah, therefore, 
ends his reflective piece by calling for a “transgender feminist approach that is not 
gender-neutral—that dares to identify asymmetry when it sees it.”
Derrida’s work to deconstruct the notion of woman (and thereby, some have 
argued, the entire gender system) is largely consistent with this characterization 
of some threads of trans theory today, especially as such threads intertwine 
with queer theory. The two steps in the process of deconstruction are one way 
of telling this history: first, privilege the subordinate term and, second, upset 
the binary itself, thereby proliferating difference in its own right (Derrida 
1971, 41). If we follow this process with the gender binary, at first we will 
privilege women. To take the example of choice from Derrida’s “Women in the 
Beehive,” women’s studies departments will need to be founded in a context 
where academic pursuits related to women have been subordinated. But eventu-
ally, if we have been effective, we will need to rename them gender studies and, 
thereafter, something as yet unthought, outside this “gender” system entirely. 
Derrida suggests this work of deconstruction will eventually get us beyond 
women. He writes:
“There is one meaning to the word ‘woman’ which is caught in the opposition, 
in the couple, and to this extent you can use the force of the woman to reverse, 
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to undermine, this [is the] first stage of opposition. Once you have succeeded, 
the word ‘woman’ does not have the same meaning. Perhaps we could not even 
speak of ‘woman’ anymore” (2005, 146–47).
This process of getting, “perhaps,” beyond woman is precisely the decon-
structive movement through which Derrida arrives at the “dream of the 
innumerable” and the “incalculable choreographies” of sexual and gender 
difference. (1982, 76) This is the deconstructive impetus to “move beyond the 
binary difference that governs the decorum of all codes,” even “beyond the 
opposition feminine/masculine” (1982, 76). It is this dream, moreover, that 
arguably forms the basis of deconstruction’s alliance with queer and transgender 
studies. As Michael O’Rourke puts it: “Queer theory has, like its pervert twin, 
deconstruction, been turned towards the future,” toward infinite resignifica-
tions of sexual orientation and sexual identity (2012, 29). Moreover, transgender 
studies, as “queer theory’s evil twin” (Stryker 2004), focuses this resignifica-
tion on gender identity and expression. Beneath these two twinnings, these 
doublings, then, lies the force of unexpected inheritance: the queer and trans 
promise of deconstruction.
From this vantage point, deconstruction appears consistent with some 
contemporary trans politics and yet, for that reason, subject to Currah’s specu-
lative critique. Is Derrida, then, at once anachronistically ahead of his time 
and yet also passé because we need to move on to a transfeminist approach 
that admits of residual asymmetry? I think there is more to Derrida’s analysis 
of gender, however, and therefore more of a sympathetic resonance between 
Derrida and Currah’s questions about contemporary gender politics.1 In order to 
demonstrate that Derrida’s critique not only fuels a movement beyond woman 
but also emphasizes an ongoing need to dismantle residual asymmetries, I turn 
now to Derrida’s theorization of “gender neutrality.”
The notion of neutralization is a focal point of “Women in the Beehive.” 
As mentioned above, this piece results from a 1984 seminar at Brown in which 
Derrida discusses the status of women’s studies in the university. While 
Derrida admits the potential of women’s studies to deconstruct the unspoken 
assumptions of the university, he nevertheless voices a concern that women’s 
studies risks becoming just “another cell in the university beehive” (2005, 
142). To explore both possibilities, Derrida identifies two kinds of deconstruc-
tion. The first, which he terms a “positive” deconstruction, foregrounds the 
transformative impulse. It aims to radically change the heterosexist system 
by privileging the presence and concerns of women in research, pedagogy, 
and administration. The second, “pessimistic” deconstruction, recognizes it is 
impossible to liberate the university entirely from hierarchy or to escape patriar-
chal law. This second deconstruction, however, aims at least “not [to] be bored 
any longer,” and continues to effect change in women’s academic position, short 
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of achieving their absolute freedom (2005, 144). While emphasizing that it is 
ideal to make both gestures at the same time, Derrida identifies a few tactics 
involved in this work. One of those tactics is gender neutralization.
In order to commend gender neutralization, Derrida first has to disam-
biguate it from its more traditional referent. To do so, he distinguishes between 
two types of gender neutralization: one that reinforces the privileged gender 
position (i.e., man) and one that neutralizes gendered opposition but not gender 
difference (2005, 151). With respect to the first, Derrida acknowledges that an 
appeal to a neutral philosophical subject has all too easily reiterated masculine 
privilege across the philosophical canon and current disciplinary norms. While 
not a new observation by any stretch of the imagination (cf. Beauvoir 1949), 
it is nevertheless important. Derrida cautions against this form of gender 
neutralization as follows: “This is a classical ruse of man to neutralize the 
sexual mark. [. . .] To the extent to which universality implies neutralization, 
you can be sure that it’s only a hidden way of confirming the man in his power. 
That’s why we have to be very cautious of neutrality and neutralization, and 
universality as neutralization” (2005, 146).
Implicit within this universalizing form of gender neutralization is a rein-
scription of the masculine subject (2005, 145). As Norma Alarćon argues, when 
the subject of feminist theory proceeds by identifying with the neutral subject 
of consciousness, usually an unmarked white and masculine subject, we are all 
too often left in a position where “[t]he subject (and object) of knowledge is 
now a woman, but the inherited view of consciousness [and subjectivity] has 
not been questioned at all” (1991, 405). For this reason, Alarćon and others 
have emphasized the necessity of situating foundational texts in women of 
color feminism (e.g., This Bridge Called My Back) as theorizing multiplicity, or 
disrupting the very idea of a unified, singular subject.
Derrida then moves to propose a second sort of neutralization, one consis-
tent with the project of deconstruction. This is the neutralization of gender 
opposition or asymmetry. He writes: “But there is another neutralization which 
can simply neutralize the sexual opposition [between “man/woman”], and not 
sexual difference, liberating the field of sexuality for a very different sexuality, 
a more multiple one. At that point, there would be more sexes . . . there would 
be one sex for each time” (2005, 151, emphasis added).
In contrast to a neutralization that maintains and obfuscates gender hier-
archy, this deconstructive neutralization attacks the gender opposition itself. It 
is only through laying repeated siege to this opposition that space is constantly 
recreated for the proliferation of gender difference. What are we to make of 
Derrida’s emphasis here on neutralizing opposition? What does it mean that 
this neutralization preconditions the proliferation of difference (rather than vice 
versa)? In other words, what do we miss by moving too quickly to the dream of 
the innumerable differences? And what does Derrida’s concern with a residual 
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hierarchy—resistant to any final destruction and yet susceptible to continual 
deconstruction—mean for this neutralizing effort? One benefit of bringing 
transgender studies, and especially transfeminism, into this conversation is 
to sharpen these questions from a contemporary standpoint. If we understand 
the “opposition” here as related to the hierarchy Currah speaks of, what then 
is both the hope and worry of this Derridean line of thinking about gender? 
Has opposition indeed been neutralized? By whose measures? In which ways?
Julia Serano’s concept of trans-misogyny is particularly helpful in thinking 
through Derrida’s appeal to “another neutralization.” In Whipping Girl, Serano 
theorizes the concept of trans-misogyny as a way to emphasize both the gener-
alized fear of gender differences as well as the specific forms this fear takes 
when directed at those trans people who embrace femininity. “When a trans 
person is ridiculed or dismissed,” Serano explains, “not merely for failing to 
live up to gender norms, but for their expressions of femaleness or femininity, 
they become the victims of a specific form of discrimination: trans-misogyny” 
(2007, 14). Serano is clear that while all trans people face social stigma for 
transgressing cisgender assumptions, those on the trans female/feminine 
spectrum tend to experience more societal “fascination, consternation, and 
demonization” (2012). Serano deepens her analysis of trans-misogyny by distin-
guishing between oppositional and traditional sexism. Oppositional sexism 
is directed at gender-nonconformity. It takes as its premise the necessity of 
a clearly carved out system of oppositional gender wherein movement across 
and between lines must be policed. It is fueled by a belief that “opposites 
without crossing” is the only acceptable gender system. Traditional sexism, 
as the name implies, is more explicitly aimed at femaleness and femininity. If 
both forms of sexism intertwine to constitute trans-misogyny, then “it is not 
simply enough for trans activists to challenge binary gender norms (i.e., oppo-
sitional sexism)—we must also challenge the idea that femininity is inferior 
to masculinity and that femaleness is inferior to maleness” (2007, 15). By her 
own account then, “trans activism must be, at its core, a feminist movement” 
(2007, 15). Trans politics must involve the continued fight for women’s rights. In 
fact, for Serano, it is only by attending to the intertwined nature of oppositional 
and traditional sexism that transfeminism can disrupt these deep-seated biases 
against both gender ambiguity and femininity.
Serano’s work helpfully extends the conversation between Derrida and 
transfeminism. Currah is concerned that a focus on gender pluralism has not 
necessarily undermined hierarchical asymmetry. If this is the case, then, in 
Derrida’s terms, the work of deconstruction—which undertakes the constant 
(if non-final) neutralization of opposition—must be renewed. For Serano, this 
work of unmaking the opposition, through an effective diagnosis of asym-
metry, cannot be conducted simply by a return to the discourse of women’s 
rights. Instead, it must begin with an affirmation of transgender experience 
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and a grappling with the fundamental force of trans-misogyny. Asking these 
questions from a transfeminist perspective maintains the critique of ahistorical, 
universal accounts of sexual difference on a new, more deeply rooted register.
Importantly, the transfeminist critique resonates with decades of scholar-
ship in women of color feminism.2 As Susan Stryker and Talia Bettcher put 
it in their introduction to a special issue of Transgender Studies Quarterly on 
transfeminism:
[. . .] intersectional feminism raised the question of whether “woman” itself 
was a sufficient analytical category capable of accounting for the various forms 
of oppression that women can experience in a sexist society, which in turn 
opened the question of whether it was sufficient to talk about sexual “differ-
ence” in the singular, between men and women, or whether feminism called 
for an account of multiple “differences” of embodied personhood along many 
different but interrelated axes. (2016, 8)
The broad swath of scholarship on gender continues to clarify the mechanisms 
through which gender is chosen and resisted, assigned and colonized. The 
growing body of work in transgender studies, in particular, provides resources 
to resist the privileging of cisgender, or non-transgender, experience in theories 
of gender. But it also increasingly merges with (and recognizes lineages of fused 
concerns with) women of color and decolonial feminism, taking seriously their 
insights into the enmeshment of gender with race, ability, class, and other 
salient categories of difference. Insofar as the sex/gender distinction has been 
used as a tool of racial and colonial hierarchies (Spillers, Lugones, etc.), trans-
gender studies is well positioned to explore how the enforcement of cisgender 
identity is tied to whiteness and colonialism, among other vectors of power.
A transfeminist approach focused on diagnosing asymmetry must then heed 
its own lessons. Just as the neutralization of opposition is not a one-time affair, 
neither will the targeted opposition remain singular. The call to proliferate 
differences must also attend to the proliferation of oppositions. Against a view, 
for example, that trans/cis is “ just another binary” that must be abolished 
in favor of the proliferation of differences, we could instead see the work of 
trans politics as (at least partially) the work of diagnosing asymmetries that 
already exist, or places where the hierarchical valuation of gender differences 
is preserved—institutionally, socially, or otherwise. Both gestures are needed: 
the call to gender pluralism and the need to continuously diagnose hierarchy. 
To read a transfeminist approach that is “not gender neutral” back into Derrida, 
then, is to place more emphasis on the moments where he insists on neutralizing 
opposition in the service of a play of difference, always granting that this work 
is never finished.
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Transfeminism, then, is a crucial interlocutor in the Derridean queer 
 feminist conversation. Currah’s questions arise in a contemporary landscape 
where trans politics have highlighted this tension between the desire for 
proliferation and the encounter with enforced opposition or asymmetry. While 
Currah’s critique of gender pluralism initially seems, by extension, to be a 
critique of Derrida’s play of differences, returning to Derrida’s discussion of 
gender neutralization provides an unexpected resonance between deconstruc-
tion and transfeminism. Both recommend vigilance against the continual 
reinscription of hierarchy, whether through hetero-patriarchal law or cissexist 
praxis. In conclusion, transgender studies offers a rich vantage point from 
which to explore the risks and benefits of a focus on gender pluralism or the 
dance of innumerable differences.
—San Diego State University
Notes
1. I emphasize that Currah notes he is working through questions for a forthcoming
project. His post is a call to think about current events around the bathroom bills
and resulting boycotts, not a statement of position.
2. For just two examples of this work, see Combahee and Crenshaw.
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